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 ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the impact a block trade in the underlying stock market has on 
options listed on that stock in the options market. There is significant debate in previous 
literature in regards to which market leads, and which market is preferred by informed 
traders. This thesis contributes to, and extends previous literature, by examining the 
relationship between stocks and options around block trades in a different geographical 
setting. Furthermore, by using a combined dataset provided by SIRCA and the Australian 
Securities Exchange, this dissertation is able to identify individual brokers executing block 
trades and analyse their activity in the options market. This unique dataset allows a direct test 
of the “inter-market front-running” hypothesis proposed by in prior literature. Results from 
this dissertation are consistent with previous literature, and indicate that the stock market 
leads the options market by as much as fifteen minutes. Analysis of Broker ID’s confirms that 
there is no evidence of any inter-market front-running. 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Extant literature thoroughly examines the relationship between the stock market and the stock 
options market. There is much conflict as to whether or not one market leads the other in 
regards to the level of information reflected in observed prices. Those in favour of the stock 
market leading the option market include Stephan and Whaley (1990), with their results 
suggesting that the stock market leads the options market by fifteen to twenty minutes. Chan, 
Chung and Johnson (1993) show that, by analysing transaction prices, there is a lead of 
fifteen minutes of the stock market over the options market. Finucane (1999) find that neither 
the stock market nor the options market leads when five-minute intervals are constructed 
using bid-ask quotes, but using variable intervals, show that stock market leads are present. In 
the Australian setting, Jarnecic (1999) empirically analyses the intraday relations between 
trading volume of underlying stocks and stock options listed on the ASX using fifteen minute 
intraday observations, and finds that stocks typically lead stock options by as much as fifteen 
minutes1. 
 
Other studies examine the information contained in options prices as a means of determining 
which market leads the other. Easley, O’Hara and Srinavas (1998) find that options markets 
are preferred for information based trading.  On the other hand, Biais and Hillion (1994) find 
that the options market may, in some cases, reduce the amount of information revealed to the 
market by an informed trader. 
 
                                                            
1 The study is performed in the time period prior to the merger between the then Australian Stock Exchange and 
Sydney Futures exchange. 
Early work by Manaster and Rendleman (1982) document that closing options prices contain 
information about equilibrium stock prices not contained in the closing prices of underlying 
stocks and suggest that the options market leads stock markets. Kumar, Sarin and Shastri 
(1992) also examine this relationship; particularly the relationship surrounding block 
transactions that occur in the underlying stock market. Earlier work notes that options 
markets are able to provide a trading environment that has lower transactions costs and higher 
leverage compared to stock markets. Based on prior theory, this is attractive to informed 
traders, with options being the superior investment vehicle. The information contained in 
their trades is revealed in option prices, thus causing the implied underlying price 
(determined through inverting the Black-Scholes pricing model) to change. Kumar, Sarin and 
Shastri (1992) use this as the basis for their paper, and propose that the options market should 
lead the stock market as a result. 
 
Analysing the return behaviour surrounding block trades in the underlying stock, Kumar, 
Sarin and Shastri (1992) find that the options market exhibits abnormal price behaviour 
starting thirty minutes before a block trade, while the price reaction in the stock market leads 
the block by fifteen minutes.  It is this thirty minute lead that Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) 
suggest is consistent with the existence2 of inter-market front-running. This phenomenon is 
defined as “trading in the derivative securities market based on the knowledge of an 
impending stock trade that is expected to have an impact on the value of the derivative 
security” (Kumar, Sarin and Shastri, 1992, p.880). 
 
As previously noted, Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) suggest that abnormal price behaviour 
identified is evidence of inter-market front running. The data used in their study is sourced 
                                                            
2 It must, however, be noted that this is not direct evidence of front-running, since the same price reaction would 
result if large blocks in stocks are first transacted off the floor, and then recorded at a later time on the floor 
from stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and options on those stocks 
listed on the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE). In the Australian context, both the 
stocks and options on these stocks are traded on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). 
Hence, there is a geographical advantage with the data is sourced. Furthermore, the data used 
in Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) did not contain information about the actual trader. The 
data from the ASX contains what are known as Broker ID’s. These are unique identification 
numbers that apply to individual brokers. These ID’s are the same across both options and 
equity markets. 
 
This dissertation extends the literature by aiding in understanding the complex relationship 
between the two markets in the Australian context, and through access to a more 
comprehensive and current data set, provides light on whether or not there is inter-market 
front-running, or informed trading occurring in options markets. Similar to that of Kumar, 
Sarin and Shastri (1992), this dissertation examines the relationship by analysing the returns 
in the stock options market around block trades in the underlying stock market. Fifteen 
minute intervals are constructed before and after block trades, and abnormal returns are 
calculated. To further test the relationship, causality tests are performed on the abnormal 
returns in the options market against the lead, lag and contemporaneous abnormal returns of 
the stock market. This dissertation also examines the individual trades executed by brokers 
identified as having executed the block trade. 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a brief outline 
of the institutional details of the ASX. Chapter 3 presents a review of the previous literature 
surrounding the lead-lag relationship between the stock and options markets and informed 
trading using options. Chapter 4 describes the data used, and Chapter 5 describes the 
methodology employed. Chapter 6 presents the results of the analysis. Chapter 7 presents the 
results of additional robustness tests. Chapter 8 concludes and provides suggestions for future 
research. 
 2. INSTITUTIONAL DETAIL 
 
2.1 ASX Share Market 
 
All trades in ASX-listed equities take place on the ASX’s computerised trading system 
known as ITS (Integrated trading system). Unlike the NYSE which runs an electronic order 
book alongside specialist market makes, the ASX relies solely on orders posted through this 
system. The ITS Workstation was launched in July 2006 and replaced the SEATS system, 
also an electronic based system. 
 
Orders are entered into a Participant’s ITS terminals and transmitted to the market via the 
ASX’s host computer which in turn sends the order to all Participants’ terminals. 
The ITS system matches buy and sell orders then trades them automatically, leading to trades. 
Best priced orders have priority, and if there is more than one orders in the order book at the 
same price, the order that was placed first takes precedence. Large orders have no priority 
over small orders. The ITS is a modified version of the CLICK system developed by OMX 
Technology, a company that provides exchange technology to over 24 international 
exchanges and clearing houses. CLICK is used by many exchanges around the world and is 
recognised as the leading automated trading system for derivatives. 
 2.2 ASX Options Market 
 
Exchange traded options3 are also traded on ITS. Unlike the ASX equities market where 
liquidity is provided by electronic orders, the options market also uses Market Makers to 
provide liquidity. Each market maker is assigned one or more stocks in which they must meet 
certain obligations4 for certain percentages of time. This involves quoting buy and sell prices 
for a certain number of series, and/or responding to requests from other market participants 
for prices.  
 
Normal trading in the options market occurs between 10:00 and 16:00 EST.  (include 
paragraph on types of options listed) 
 
 
                                                            
3 Please see Appendix A for details of exchange traded option contracts. 
4 Market Makers can choose to have the following obligations: a) make a market on a continuous basis only; or 
b) make a market in response to Quote Requests only; or c) make a market both on a continuous basis and in 
response to quote requests. 
 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Lead-Lag relationships 
 
The notion of the lead-lag relationship between stock and option prices has is discussed since 
the early 1970’s with Black (1975) noting that the market with higher leverage and lower 
transactions costs being the more attractive to traders. Extending this idea was Manaster and 
Rendleman (1982). Using the Black-Scholes option pricing model, price is a function of the 
current value of the underlying stock, the instantaneous variance of the stock's rate of return, 
the time to maturity of the option, the risk-free rate of interest, and the options exercise price. 
Hence, one can determine the price of the underlying stock that equates the observed option 
price given those parameters. Thus, if options are actually priced according to the model, 
these implied stock prices can be considered the option market's assessment of equilibrium 
stock values. 
 
Manaster and Rendleman (1982) note that “in the long run, the trading vehicle that provides 
the greatest liquidity, the lowest trading costs and the least restrictions is likely to play the 
predominant role in the market's determination of the equilibrium values of underlying 
stocks” (p. 1044) Hence the options market may provide this role. Furthermore, investors that 
regard options as a more superior investment alternative, may use options as their primary 
source of trade and indirectly disseminate information regarding the equilibrium stock price. 
Some reasons for this may include trading costs, short sale restrictions and margin 
requirements.  
 
The results of their study illustrate that closing options prices contain information about 
equilibrium stock prices that is not contained in the closing prices of underlying stocks. They 
propose an explanation for this finding to be that closing option and stock transactions do not 
occur at the same time, and it is possible that any additional information is impounded into 
the option price. Alternatively, they propose that closing option prices reflect fundamental 
information about the equilibrium values of underlying stocks not contained in closing stock 
prices. They test this by determining whether or not the ‘information’ contained in closing 
option prices could allow an investor to earn excess returns. These tests provide some 
evidence that closing option prices contain information not reflected in stock prices for a 
period of up to 24 hours. 
 
Following on from the work performed by Manaster and Rendleman (1982) was Battacharya 
in 1987. Looking again at the Black-Scholes pricing model, Battacharya (1987) studies the 
speed at which new information is impounded into the different market prices. The paper 
studies price revisions in both the stock and options market to test the hypothesis that there is 
no additional information contained in the option prices over the stock price. The 
methodology applied by Battacharya (1987) inverts observed options prices and compares it 
to the concurrent stock price. No-arbitrage theory would imply that there are no differences 
as an arbirtrage opportunity would be available. If there is a difference, various trading 
strategies are applied to test the null hypothesis that stock and options markets are 
synchronous and reflect common information simultaneously. Results indicate that there is 
some additional information contained in options prices over stock prices. However, this 
information is not sufficient to cover any implicit costs such as the bid-ask spread and search 
costs, suggesting that the hypothesis tested cannot be rejected. Furthermore the work 
performed by Battacharya (1987) does not explicity examine the lead-lag relationships. 
 Subsequent lead-lag relationship work has been performed by Anthony (1988). Rather than 
focusing on the price, as in Manaster and Rendleman (1982), this relationship is analysed 
through the use of trading volumes in the different stocks and options. The use of volume is 
based on idea that trading volume can be considered a proxy for information arrival. Anthony 
(1988) proposes that if information is revealed in options trading, then a lead-lag relationship 
between the option and stock trading volumes should exist. Where there is symmetric 
information, an instantaneous feedback relationship between the two markets should exist. 
Using various causality tests, the results in Anthony (1988) imply that option trading volume 
leads stock volume with a one day lag. This result is consistent with the idea that volume can 
be used a proxy for information arrival and Black’s (1975) hypothesised option-information 
trading preference. 
 
Following this, Stephan and Whaley (1990) suggest that in theory, options are redundant in 
the market place because they are considered ‘redundant securities’, i.e. they are simply a 
leveraged position in the underlying stock. Therefore, in perfectly frictionless markets, any 
change in the stock price should have an equal change in the price of the option.  
Markets however are not perfectly frictionless, and the effect a change in one market has on 
the other is likely to a significant amount of noise. Further, Stephan and Whaley (1990) 
propose that the choice traders make to trade in a particular market is likely to depend on 
what incentives they have to trade in that market. Hence, this will result in a lead-lag 
relationship between the two markets. In direct contrast to the earlier Manaster and 
Rendleman (1982) and Battacharya (1988) studies, Stephan and Whaley (1990) find in favour 
of the stock market leading the options market. Stephan and Whaley (1990) estimated four 
different regressions, with all results suggesting that the stock market leads the options 
market by fifteen to twenty minutes; a small feedback relationship between options and 
stocks is also noted.  Stephan and Whaley (1990) propose that reason for stocks prices 
leading options prices is due to informational advantages. They propose that traders are more 
likely to use to options for return/risk management motives as oppose to acting on new 
information.  To further investigate this informational trading hypothesis, they split the data 
into high and low delta options. As because high delta options have the lowest transactions 
costs, traders that want to quickly trade on information are more inclined to use these options. 
Their results indicate high delta options price movements are more closely linked to stock 
prices compared to low delta options, but the lead time between the stocks and options is 
similar to their original results.   
 
Chan, Chung and Johnson (1993) revisit this idea and propose an alternative explanation for 
the results presented in Stephan and Whaley (1990). They propose that the reason for their 
findings stems from the various tick sizes between options and stocks. The minimum move or 
tick for a stock in Stephan and Whaley (1990) is typically one-eighth, while the tick for 
options with prices greater than three dollars is also an eighth and one-sixteenth for less than 
three dollars. Thus, to move the option price a much larger percentage change in the stock 
price must occur. Small moves in the stock will not immediately be reflected in the option as 
the change in theoretical value of the option is less than the tick, and so the option does not 
trade. Hence, they hypothesise the stock should lead the option for both tick sizes.  
 
As well as questioning the work performed in the Stephan and Whaley (1990), Chan, Chung 
and Johnson (1993) derive the following hypotheses for the lead-lag relationship between 
stocks and options. In perfect markets there should be no arbitrage opportunities available; 
the consequence is that stock and option markets should neither lead nor lag each other. Thus, 
they look at other reasons for why one market could lead (lag) the other. 
One reason they propose is the private information hypothesis – there are numerous factors 
that traders with private information consider in order to maximise their utility. These include 
borrowing constraints, probability of being detected, transaction costs and the liquidity of the 
market they are trading in. The trader with information offering a high return wants to trade 
in the market with the lowest probability of being detected and the greatest leverage. This 
would suggest that the market preferred would be the options market and the options market 
will lead the stock market, Furthermore, options that are deep out of the money will be the 
most desirable as they provide the greatest leverage and will have the longest lead. 
 
The second hypothesis is the infrequent trading hypothesis – this hypothesis predicts that 
stocks will lead the options market based on tick sizes. As noted earlier, this is due to the 
stock price having to make many moves in order to make the option price move. However, as 
market makers for the options can change the bid-ask quotes without waiting for an incoming 
order, they are easier to adjust and should reflect information more quickly than the 
transaction price. The discreteness of the tick implies that the bid and the ask must also be 
changed by at least one tick, but the market maker has more freedom in choosing the 
midpoint of the spread because it is not necessary to change both the bid and ask at the same 
time. This implies the possibility of situations where the stock price changes by a tick, the 
option market maker adjusts either the bid or the ask or both, but the option transaction price 
does not change. Hence the infrequent trading hypothesis proposed by Chan, Chung and 
Johnson (1993) implies that the stock lead over the option should diminish or even disappear 
when using bid-ask quotes to test the relationship, as opposed to using actual transaction 
prices. 
 The results presented in the Chan, Chung and Johnson (1993) are consistent with the results 
presented in the Stephan and Whaley (1990). Using a different methodology to that of 
Stephan and Whaley (1990), they show that the by analysing transaction prices there is a lead 
of fifteen minutes of the stock market over the options market. Furthermore, they show by 
analysing bid-ask quotes rather than transaction prices, the result disappears, and state that 
the lead may be a spurious result caused by the different tick sizes in the two securities. They 
find no evidence for their private information hypothesis.  
 
Consistent with the work of the Stephan and Whaley (1990) and Chan, Chung and Johnson 
(1993) is Finucane (1999). Motivated by conflicting results presented in earlier literature, 
Finucane (1999) examines the same issue, but employs a different methodology to the 
original fixed interval length approach. Finucane (1999) argues that incorrect inferences are 
likely to be drawn when the length of the fixed interval is long relative to the length of the 
lead. Furthermore, fixed intervals may obscure any leads that are present and lead to the 
incorrect conclusion that information is reflected simultaneously in the two markets where 
the time required for traders in one market to react to information in the other market is less 
than the interval length. In addition, intervals that are too long can also lead to biased 
estimates of lead lengths.  Other problems can arise by reducing the interval length to avoid 
such a bias, resulting in a higher number of intervals with missing observations. Finucane 
(1999) states that such measurement error caused by missing observations will affect the 
consistency and efficiency of coefficient estimates, causing significant leads to be found 
where none exist.  
 
If option transactions occur less frequently than stock transactions, intervals with missing 
option prices will occur more frequently than intervals with missing stock prices, and tests 
will be biased toward concluding that the stock market leads the options market. The opposite 
will tend to occur when option transactions are more frequent than stock transactions. To 
measure leads that may be shorter than five minutes, while avoiding the potential biases that 
are likely to be induced by missing intervals, Finucane (1999) uses ordered quote changes in 
the stock and option markets to construct variable-length price-change intervals.  
 
The overall results from Finucane (1999) are consistent with the results in Chan, Chung and 
Johnson (1993), that neither the stock market nor the options market leads when five-minute 
intervals are constructed using bid-ask quotes. However, by using variable intervals, 
Finucane (1999) shows that leads are present, but are shorter than five minutes and that 
stocks tend to lead options. The length of the lead is identified as being between a few 
seconds but generally no longer than six minutes. In addition, the study finds that option-
quote changes occasionally lead stock-quote changes by a few minutes. Finucane (1999) 
suggests that this may be a function of informed traders having heterogeneous market 
preference with the majority of their information based trading occurring in the stock market, 
conflicting with the notion proposed by Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992), that traders with 
information are more likely to front-run in options markets. 
 
Little work has been performed around the lead-lag relationship in the Australian context. 
Jarnecic (1999) investigates the intraday relations between the trading volume of underlying 
stocks and stock options listed on the ASX and ASX Options Market using fifteen minute 
intervals from intraday observations.  The study finds that stocks typically lead stock options 
by as much as 15 minutes, consistent with tprevious US studies. Jarnecic (1999) suggests that 
this result may be due to the difference in stock and option activity peaks, after adjusting for 
differences in opening time between markets; Jarnecic (1999) hypothesises and finds that the 
stock lead is reduced after opening intervals are eliminated. Furthermore, Jarnecic (1999) 
hypothesises that the lead stocks have over options is a function of the stocks trading in 
higher volumes compared to options. Adjusting the study to accommodate for differences in 
trading,   Jarnecic (1999) removes all 15-minute interval observations that exhibit zero stock 
or option trading volumes. Jarnecic (1999) finds there to be no lead-lag relation between 
stock and stock options and suggests this to be “a phenomena induced by less frequent 
trading of options.” (p. 88). This finding in consistent with the US studies by Chan, Chung 
and Johnson (1993) and Finucane (1999). 
 
3.2 Informed Trading. 
 
Having considered the work performed by previous literature, Easley, O’Hara and Srinavas 
(1998) also examine whether or not there is information conveyed through options trading. 
Their main finding is that options markets are a venue for information based trading. This 
conclusion is inconsistent with earlier work. Their analysis and results are different to 
previous work in that the model they use predicts why the volume of particular types of 
option trades may indicate information-based trading. The option volumes they use are based 
on the option trades that are entered by traders acting on the basis of good and bad 
information, as opposed to actual trading volumes used in prior research. They show that 
"positive news" option volumes and "negative news" option volumes have predictive power 
for stock price movements. The key element of the model is that it allows informed (or 
insider) traders to choose whether they buy or sell a stock or an option. This is a function of 
the prevailing depth and leverage in the market.  
 An empirical test of the model presents results consistent to that of Stephan and Whaley 
(1990). However, when option trades are aggregated into positive-news trades and negative 
news trades they are able to reject their hypothesis that option volumes carry no information 
about future stock price changes. In addition they use Granger causality tests and find option 
volumes lag stock price changes by twenty to thirty minutes, but option volumes effect stock 
price changes much more rapidly.  
 
Biasis and Hillion (1994) examine the effect that options have on risk-sharing and the 
revealing of information. In essence, they are studying the interaction between information 
asymmetry and market incompleteness. They find asymmetric information increases the cost 
of trading in financial markets, and that there is a large proportion of insider traders, liquidity 
style trading ceases and the market breaks down. While the introduction of the option 
‘completes’ the market, in some cases it reduces the degree of information the insider will 
reveal in their trades. In the incomplete market, the insider with very good (or very bad) 
information will buy (sell) stocks. In the complete market with the options, the trades 
executed in the stock market are less extreme, as they will execute trades that include both 
stocks and options. Biasis and Hillion (1994) consider this to be attractive for insiders as the 
trades can obfuscate their information content, resulting in trades which are difficult for the 
market to interpret. 
 
 4. DATA 
 
The data used for this dissertation is sourced from Reuters and the Australian Securities 
Exchange and are matched to provide various details including prevailing bid-ask quotes. 
Each trade in the combined dataset for both stocks and options is accurately time stamped 
and includes the price, volume, whether it the trade was a buy or sell, and which broker 
executed the trade. In addition, the options data is sorted by series and includes the exercise 
price and maturity date. The data extends from 1 December, 2005 to 30 September, 2006. 
This period is selected as it occurs after the removal of broker IDs in November 2005. 
 
The options selected are classified as Category 1 options and are the considered to be the 
most liquid traded options. The stocks selected for this dissertation are the underlying of 
these options. Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) select the options based on the shortest 
maturity options that are listed at the time of the block trade as “they are the most sensitive to 
changes in stock price.” (p. 881).  Due to the vast differences in liquidity between the US and 
Australian option markets, this dissertation uses all options series with expiry dates greater 
than 7 days (insert reference). This ensures that the study does not capture any of the 
confounding effects associated with increased trading to capture the ability to exercise at 
maturity. 
 
4.1 Block trades 
 
In Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) block trades are defined as having at least 10,000 shares 
traded, the relative size of trade is at least 0.1%, where relative size is defined as number of 
shares traded divided by number of shares outstanding, and it is not the opening transaction 
of the day. Furthermore, only one block trade is selected per day, and this trade occurs within 
the period ninety minutes after the opening and two hours before the close, and is the largest 
uptick or downtick trade for that day for each stock. 
 
As the definition used in Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) is defined for stocks on the NYSE, 
for this dissertation block trades are defined as in Frino, Jarnecic, Johnstone and Lepone 
(2005) which looks specifically for large trades on the ASX. For the period 1 March, 2006 to 
30 September, 2006, block transactions are defined as the largest 1% of on-market 
transactions for each stock, over the sample period. Like Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992), a 
second criterion is applied to isolate the block trades used; there must be only one block trade 
selected per day, it lies within the time frame ninety minutes from opening and two hours 
before market close, and is the largest uptick or downtick trade for that day across each stock. 
This results in 2,672 blocks trades with 1,338 downtick block trades and 1,334 uptick block 
trades across all stocks and all days during the period 1 March, 2006 to 30 September, 2006.  
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for the 2,672 block trades for the period 1 March, 
2006 to 30 September, 2006. Consistent with the block trades in Kumar, Sarin and Shastri 
(1992), the table shows there to be no significant difference between the sample selected and 
the original population it is drawn from. 
 
Table 4.1 Block Trade Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the mean, median and range of the number of shares traded and the dollar value (in 
millions) for the sample and population of block trades on 26 stocks which traded on the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) and had listed options that also traded on the (ASX) for the period spanning 1 
March, 2006 and 30 September, 2006. The block trades in the population of 77,236 block trades are defined 
as in Frino, Jarnecic, Johnson and Lepone (2005) as the largest 1% of on-market transactions for each stock. 
The sample of 2,672 block trades are selected using the following criteria: (1) only one block trade per day, 
(2) it lies between the time period 11:30am and 2:30pm and, (3) it is the largest trade by volume for both 
uptick and downtick blocks. 
 Uptick blocks Downtick blocks 
 
Sample 
N = 1334 
Population 
N = 38876 
Sample 
N = 1338 
Population 
N = 38360 
Panel A : Number of Shares Traded (Thousands) 
     Mean 69.96 52.20 78.68 52.20
     Median 30.00 25.00 30.00 25.00
     Minimum 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
     Maximum 2,300.06 4,000.00 4000.00 4,000
Panel B : Dollar Value of shares traded (Thousands) 
     Mean 596.36 528.70 602.74 527.35
     Median 450.54 42.24 444.70 42.00
     Minimum 5.00 5.00 131.20 129.10
     Maximum 860.22 14,480.00 14,480.00 14,480.00
 
 
 5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This dissertation uses three methods to examine the relationship between stocks and their 
options around block trades. The first two methods are replicate Kumar ,Sarin and Shastri 
(1992) and involve analysing returns generated around the block trade event, and further 
investigating this relationship using a granger causality test on lagged returns to determine if 
a  feedback relationship exists between the stock and option returns. The third method is 
based on the exclusive attributes of the dataset used in this dissertation. As this dataset 
contains broker identification numbers (Broker ID’s), the final method involves examining 
the timing and nature of the trades executed by the brokers who are identified as executing 
the block trades.  
 
5.1 Analysis of returns 
This dissertation analyses the relationship of stock and option prices around block trades by 
examining the abnormal returns over twelve fifteen minute intervals starting one hour before 
and ending two hours after the block trade. This approach is based on the method used in 
Kumar ,Sarin and Shastri (1992). Returns over each interval t are calculated as: 
 
The price at interval t is taken to be the last observed transaction in that interval. If there is no 
trade in interval t, prices are recorded as missing in both intervals t and (t+1).  
 
As with the majority event studies, one of the largest issues is the benchmark return used to 
calculate abnormal returns. Bootstrapping procedures are often used in intraday analysis due 
to the non-normality of intraday returns (as in Kumar, Sarin and Shastri 1992, also see 
Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988 and Busse and Green, 2002). The approach used in this study 
is similar to that of Aitken and Frino (1996) who examine the returns of trades around a block 
trade in the stock market. The control benchmark return used in their study is the mean return 
selected from the set of all trades for a given stock which occurred in the same minute of each 
trading day as the trade to be examined, over the year prior to the date of that trade. Aitken 
and Frino (1996) selected the control benchmark using this method “to avoid any potential 
time of day biases, analogous to that used by Brown and Foster (1992)” (p. 56). 
 
Average benchmark returns are calculated by stock for each of the 26 fifteen minute intervals 
in the trading day starting three months5 prior to the block trade. For options, the average 
returns are calculated across option series written on block trade stocks.  Abnormal returns 
are then calculated as the difference between the observed return in interval t and the average 
benchmark return for that interval over the previous 60 trading days. 
 
5.2 The relationship between stock and option returns 
 
The first method of analysing the relationship examines returns in the intervals that both 
precede and follow block trades; however this does not indicate what impact the returns in 
the stock options have on the underlying stocks or vice-a-versa. To further test the 
relationship between returns, a regression is estimated using the lead, lag and 
                                                            
5 The equivalent of 60 trading days. 
contemporaneous returns of the underlying stock, similar to Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992). 
Specifically, the following equation is estimated: 
 
 
 
Where ARkjt is the abnormal return on security j in time interval t, and k is O for options and 
S for stocks. If the option market lags the stock market then one would expect β1 is expected 
to be positive (negative) for calls (puts). If options lead returns in the underlying stocks, then 
β-1 is expected to be positive (negative) for calls (puts). The regression is estimated separately 
for uptick and downtick blocks, and separately for calls and puts. 
 
 5.3 Broker ID Analysis 
 
Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) suggest that their results may be drawn by inter-market 
front-running in the options market prior to the block trade. Due to the differences in liquidity 
in the options and the stock market in the Australian setting, it may be difficult to pick up this 
result. The dataset used in this dissertation contains broker identification numbers (Broker 
ID’s). These are unique numbers that can identify which broker is trading, and is identical 
across the trading of stocks and options. 
 
This additional information is unique to the ASX dataset provided and allows for a more in 
depth look at how the brokers are trading prior to block trades. For each block trade identified 
earlier, Broker ID’s are matched to any trade executed by that broker in the stock options 
market for the option written on the stock. 
 
These option trades are then split into various categories, depending on whether the trade is 
executed before or after the block trade, and whether the broker bought or sold the options. 
This is performed for both call options and put options, and for downtick and uptick block 
trades. Further analysis examines whether the options traded are in the money, at the money 
or out of the money. The moneyness ratio is calculated as the stock price divided by the 
exercise price for call options and the exercise price divided by the stock price for put 
options, as performed in Chakravarty, Gulen and Mayhew (2004). Options are considered At 
the Money (ATM) if the ratio lies between 0.98 and 1.02. If the ratio is below 0.98 it is 
considered Out of the Money (OTM) and if above 1.02 it is considered to be In the Money 
(ITM), as defined in Engstrom (2002). 
 
 6. RESULTS 
6. 1 Analysis of Returns 
6.1.1 Shares 
Table 6.1 presents the results for the behaviour of stock prices in the intervals surrounding the 
sample of block trades.  Prices are examined in the four 15 minute intervals preceding the 
block trade and the eight 15 minute intervals following.  The interval containing the block 
trade is also examined.  
Panel A and Panel B document the mean abnormal return, the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) and their relevant p-values for the students’ one-tail t test statistic.  Panel A indicates 
that for uptick block trades, significant mean abnormal returns start in the 15 minutes prior to 
the block trade occurring with the peak positive mean abnormal return of 0.07% in the 
interval of the block trade.  Any abnormal returns following the block trade are not 
significant.  The CAR indicate that returns continue to trend upward but are insignificant.  
Panel B indicates similar to the uptick block trades, downtick blocks experience significant 
mean abnormal returns starting in the interval 30 minutes prior to the block trade, occurring 
with the lowest mean abnormal return of 0.054% in the interval of the block trade. Any 
abnormal returns following the block trade are again not significant. The CAR results 
indicate similar effects as with the uptick block trades. 
These results are consistent with the results in previous studies on ASX block trades. Both 
Anderson, Cooper and Provost (2006) and earlier work performed by Aitken and Frino 
(1996) document a positive abnormal return associated with uptick block trades and negative 
abnormal return associated with downtick block trades. Figure 6.1 illustrates the results from 
Table 6.1 and suggests that any effects of the block trade are impounded into the price 
relatively quickly. The CAR results exhibit the same asymmetry as seen in Anderson, Cooper 
and Provost (2006) and Frino, Jarnecic, Johnstone and Lepone (2005) which indicates that 
there is price continuation following block purchases and partial price reversals following 
block sales. This is illustrated in Figure 6.1.  
Table 6.1 Stock Abnormal Returns surrounding Block Transactions 
Table 6.1 presents results for the abnormal returns generated around block trades in the  
underlying stock market. Time interval represents the fifteen minute interval under analysis. 
Mean Abnormal return represents the arithmetic average of abnormal returns in the interval 
(measured in percentage). CAR represents the cumulative average abnormal return across all 
stocks (measured in percentage). 
Time Interval 
(minutes) 
Mean Abnormal  
return (%) 
p-value 
(t-statistic) 
CAR 
(%) 
Panel A: Uptick Blocks 
-60 0.0096 0.2074 0.0096 
-45 0.0050 0.4853 0.0146 
-30 0.0129 0.0682 0.0275 
-15 0.0316 0.0000 0.0591 
0 0.0726 0.0000 0.1317 
15 0.0059 0.3242 0.1376 
30 0.0044 0.4612 0.1420 
45 0.0013 0.8170 0.1433 
60 0.0063 0.2777 0.1496 
75 0.0028 0.6090 0.1524 
90 0.0035 0.5511 0.1559 
105 0.0021 0.7250 0.1580 
120 0.0071 0.2514 0.1651 
Panel B : Downtick Blocks 
-60 -0.0152 0.0532 -0.0152 
-45 0.0030 0.6802 -0.0122 
-30 -0.0139 0.0281 -0.0261 
-15 -0.0510 0.0000 -0.0771 
0 -0.0543 0.0000 -0.1314 
15 -0.0019 0.7578 -0.1333 
30 0.0040 0.5273 -0.1293 
45 0.0019 0.7377 -0.1274 
60 0.0101 0.0630 -0.1173 
75 -0.0047 0.3870 -0.1220 
90 0.0058 0.3355 -0.1162 
105 0.0091 0.1278 -0.1071 
120 0.0085 0.1759 -0.0986 
 
 
Figure 6.1. (put below to make figure wider) 
This Figure displays the mean abnormal return and CAR’s for the sample of fifteen minute interval 
returns four intervals prior the block transaction and eight intervals after the block transaction. Results 
are split into downtick and uptick block trades. 
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Panel B 
 
 
6.1.2 Calls Options 
 
Table 6.2 presents the results for the behaviour of call options prices in the intervals around 
the block trade in the underlying stock. As with the shares, prices are examined in the four 15 
minute intervals preceding the block trade and the eight 15 minute intervals following, for 
both uptick and downtick block trades.  The interval containing the block trade is also 
examined. Panel A and Panel B show the mean abnormal return, the CAR and their relevant 
p-values for the students’ one-tail t test statistic.  
Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) find that option prices react over a period beginning thirty 
minutes before and ending sixty minutes after the block trade. They find that call options 
prices increase by around 9.38% in the sixty minute period around an uptick block trade, with 
the majority of returns at the time of, and following, the block trade. 
Panel A indicates substantial price movement in call options prior to the block transaction 
occurring, but no returns are significant at the 1% or 5% levels. The only significant 
abnormal return occurs in the 15 minute interval following the block trade and indicates a 
positive abnormal return of 2.89% (p value = 0.024).   The CAR results indicate that returns 
on call options increase over the intervals under analysis, consistent with the stock price 
reaction. 
Panel B indicates that similar to the uptick block trades, there is substantial but insignificant 
price movement.  The only significant abnormal return occurs in the interval of the block 
trade. The CAR results for downtick block trades do not  indicate any significant changes or 
trends in the movement of call prices for downtick blocks.  
 
Table 6.2 Call Option Abnormal Returns surrounding block transactions 
This table presents results for the abnormal returns generated around block trades in 
the underlying stock market. Time interval represents the fifteen minute interval 
under analysis. Mean Abnormal return represents the arithmetic average of abnormal 
returns in the interval (measured in percentage). CAR represents the cumulative 
average abnormal return across all stocks (measured in percentage). 
Time Interval 
(minutes) 
Mean Abnormal  
return (%) 
p-value 
(t-statistic) 
CAR 
(%) 
Panel A: Uptick Blocks 
-60 0.4451 0.7468 0.4451 
-45 3.945 0.168 4.3901 
-30 0.428 0.7031 4.8181 
-15 1.997 0.1526 6.8151 
0 1.1631 0.3033 7.9782 
15 2.8936 0.0246 10.8718 
30 5.2525 0.2342 15.8040 
45 -0.3203 0.856 15.4837 
60 -1.3419 0.3049 14.4621 
75 1.3369 0.1871 15.7990 
90 0.3933 0.7139 16.1923 
105 1.7054 0.2262 17.8977 
120 1.2468 0.5244 19.1445 
Panel B : Downtick Blocks 
-60 0.5231 0.709 0.5231 
-45 0.3329 0.7802 0.8560 
-30 1.1131 0.2797 1.9691 
-15 1.554 0.1792 3.5231 
0 -2.8253 0.0102 0.6978 
15 2.3868 0.2198 3.0846 
30 -1.0154 0.3427 2.0692 
45 -1.165 0.3656 0.9042 
60 0.2529 0.8646 1.1571 
75 1.5376 0.287 2.6947 
90 2.5093 0.299 5.204 
105 0.651 0.7016 5.855 
120 0.0593 0.9735 2.0692 
 
The above results imply that the information contained in the block trades in the underlying 
market take longer to be impounded into the prices of the call option. Furthermore, the CAR 
results suggest that uptick block trades have more of an effect on the price of call options 
than downtick blocks. The results from Table 6.2 are illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2 
This Figure displays the mean abnormal return and CAR’s for the sample of fifteen minute interval 
returns four intervals prior the block transaction and eight intervals after the block transaction. Results 
are split into uptick (Panel A) and downtick (Panel B) block trades. 
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6.1.3 Put Options 
 
Table 6.3 presents results for the behaviour of put options prices in the intervals surrounding 
the block trade in the underlying stock. As with the shares and call options, prices are 
examined in the four 15 minute intervals preceding the block trade and the eight 15 minute 
intervals following, for both uptick and downtick block trades.  The interval containing the 
block trade is also examined. Panel A and Panel B show the mean abnormal return, the CAR 
and the relevant p-values for the students’ one-tail t test statistic.  
For put options, Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) find the price movement for the uptick 
block trades occurs predominantly in the intervals prior to and at the block trade. For the 
downtick block trades, the price movement tends to occur during the block interval, and the 
intervals post the block trade. 
Panel A indicates that for an uptick block trade, there are no significant price movements. 
The only significant abnormal return occurs in the 15 minute interval preceding the block 
trade and indicates a negative abnormal return of  2.40% (p value = 0.035). As seen in the 
prices for call options surrounding a downtick block trade, there is no significant change 
experienced in the CAR for put options around an uptick block trade.  
Panel B indicates a price run-up for put options, however the majority of the returns are 
insignificant at the 1% and 5% levels. Any returns that are significant at the 10% level occur 
in the intervals following the block trade. The CAR results for downtick block trades indicate 
that the  price of  put options are increasing, with the larger increase in the intervals greater 
than thirty minutes after the block trade.  
The results again indicate that it takes longer for the information in block trades to be 
reflected in options prices. The results for the abnormal returns on uptick block trades 
indicate that traders can see the impact of the uptick block trade with the price run-up 
beginning in the 15 minute interval before the trade is executed. The traders in the put options 
thus adjust their prices to reflect the greater chance their options will be ‘out-of-the-money’ 
and hence have a lower value. Furthermore the CAR results suggest that as expected, 
downtick blocks have more of a significant effect on the price of put options than uptick 
blocks.  The results from Table 6.3 are illustrated in figure 6.3 
Table 6.3 Put option Abnormal returns around Block Transactions 
This table presents results for the abnormal returns generated around block trades in 
the underlying stock market. Time interval represents the fifteen minute interval 
under analysis. Mean Abnormal return represents the arithmetic average of abnormal 
returns in the interval (measured in percentage). CAR represents the cumulative 
average abnormal return across all stocks (measured in percentage). 
Time Interval 
(minutes) 
Mean Abnormal  
return (%) 
p-value 
(t-statistic) 
CAR 
(%) 
Panel A: Uptick Blocks 
-60 -0.3122 0.7015 -0.3122 
-45 -0.221 0.759 -0.5332 
-30 0.0891 0.8914 -0.4441 
-15 -2.3991 0.0354 -2.8432 
0 -1.55 0.1387 -4.3932 
15 0.2506 0.8214 -4.1426 
30 0.1856 0.8393 -3.9570 
45 0.286 0.8186 -3.6710 
60 0.0251 0.9768 -3.6459 
75 2.046 0.1964 -1.5999 
90 -0.4817 0.5816 -2.0816 
105 -1.2966 0.0721 -3.3782 
120 0.4001 0.7305 -2.9781 
Panel B : Downtick Blocks 
-60 -0.6343 0.3859 -0.6343 
-45 -0.4017 0.6826 -1.036 
-30 -0.4016 0.6142 -1.4376 
-15 0.3803 0.5505 -1.0573 
0 0.8838 0.3079 -0.1735 
15 -0.0365 0.9675 -0.2100 
30 1.6102 0.6307 1.4002 
45 1.439 0.074 2.8392 
60 1.6294 0.1415 4.4686 
75 2.3905 0.0816 6.8591 
90 -2.0178 0.0744 4.8413 
105 -0.2882 0.7839 4.5531 
120 2.4982 0.0505 7.0513 
 
Figure 6.3 
This Figure displays the mean abnormal return for the sample of fifteen minute interval returns 4 
intervals from the block transaction and 8 intervals after the block transaction. Results are split into 
Downtick and Uptick block trades. 
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6.2 Causality Tests 
 
The results from the analysis of the returns around the block trades suggest that the 
relationship between stocks and stock options is in favour of stocks leading their respective 
options. This result is consistent with the findings of Stephan and Whaley (1990), Chan, 
Chung and Johnson (1993) and Finucane (1999) in relation to the US markets and also 
consistent with work performed on the ASX by Jarnecic (1999), and contrary to Kumar, Sarin 
and Shastri (1992) that there are no significant abnormal returns in the intervals leading up to 
the block trade.  
 
The results of the regression analysis further confirm the above results. Table 6.4 presents the 
results for the regression analysis of stock option abnormal returns on the lead, lag and 
contemporaneous share abnormal returns for stocks in the four intervals before and the eight 
intervals following the block trade. The table documents the results for both call options and 
put options (Panel A shows the results for uptick block trades and Panel B show the results 
for downtick block trades). 
As expected, Panel A indicates that the co-efficients for both the lag share (β1) and 
contemporaneous share (β0) are significant and positive (negative) for call options (put 
options) suggesting stock options lag the underlying stock market.  The results in Panel B are 
similar and suggest that stock returns lead option returns. Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) 
also find there to be a significant co-efficient on the lead share return (β-1) for downtick call 
options around downtick block trades and put options around uptick block trades. This 
dissertation finds no such relationship. The overall results are consistent with the results from 
the return analysis implying that options lag stock returns. 
 
Table 6.4 Regressions of Option Abnormal returns on the Lag, Lead and 
Contemporaneous Stock Abnormal returns 
This Table presents the results for regressing abnormal returns in the options market with 
the lead, lag and contemporaneous stock abnormal returnsa in the fifteen minute intervals 
starting one hour before and ending two hours after the block trade. The equation estimated 
is: 
 
Where ARkjt is the abnormal return on security j in time interval t, and k is O for options and 
S for stocks.  
 Call options Puts options 
Coefficient Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
 Panel A : Uptick blocks 
Number of 
Observations 
452  447  
 0.0134 1.92 -0.0024 -0.90 
-1 8.0192 3.30** -8.2361 -8.02** 
0 5.5460 2.25* -6.3416 -6.91** 
1 -0.1654 -0.06 -2.1897 -1.91 
     
Panel A: Downtick Blocks 
Number of 
Observations 
417  425  
 0.0032 0.82 0.0030 0.73 
-1 6.5818 4.50** -3.5563 -2.10* 
0 8.0019 5.56** -6.9972 -4.47** 
1 2.7374 1.59 -0.4296 -0.26 
a Abnormal return in time interval t is the difference between the observed return in time 
interval t and the average return on the security in time interval t across the previous 60 
trading days. 
* Denotes significance at the 0.05 level 
** Denote significance at the 0.01 level 
 
 
 6.3 Broker ID Analysis 
 
The univariate and multivariate results both indicate that the stock market leads the options 
market. Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) suggest that their results are indicative of inter-
market front-running. The data they use in their study is across markets, and does not contain 
broker identifiers. While the above results suggest that options do not lead stocks, there may 
still be trading by brokers in the options market before the block trade is executed in the 
underlying market. 
If brokers are front-running their block trades, they are likely to take one of the following 
positions in the options market: for uptick block trades they will buy call options and/or sell 
put options; and for downtick block trades they are likely to buy put options and/or sell call 
options. Chakravarty, Gulen and Mahew (2004) note that informed traders are more likely to 
trade options that are OTM as they provide the greatest leverage. Furthermore, Pan and 
Poteshman (2006) suggests that for “an informed trader with positive (negative) information 
about the underlying stock, buying an OTM call (put) option provides the highest leverage” 
(p. 881) 
 
Table 6.5 presents the results from the analysis of trades executed by brokers in the options 
market who are identified as executing a block trade in the stock market. It shows the number 
of trades executed and the volume of options traded before and after the block trade is 
executed. The table also identifies whether the block trade is uptick or downtick and whether 
the broker purchased or sold the option. 
 
In both Panel A and Panel B, the bold values represent trades that provide brokers with the 
greatest profits if they trade on the knowledge of the impending block trade. Panel A shows 
that the majority of the trades by these brokers occurs in the period after the block trade is 
executed, with the majority of trading concentrated in call options (both buying and selling).  
 
Panel B documents the results for downtick block trades. Again, if traders are attempting to 
profit from their information, the expectation is increased trading activity prior to the block 
trade, for both purchasing put options and selling call options. Before the block trade is 
executed, there is greater activity in selling calls than purchasing call options, and in 
purchasing puts than selling puts. However, the majority of trading in options by these 
brokers occurs in the period after the block trade is executed.  
 
Table 6.6 presents the results from the analysis of trades executed by brokers in the options 
market based on the moneyness ratio of the options traded. As with Table 6.5, it shows the 
number of trades executed and the volume of options traded before and after the block trade 
is performed, when the block trade is uptick or downtick, and across purchases and sales of 
call and put options. 
 
In both Panel A and Panel B, the bold values represent trades that provide brokers with the 
greatest profits if they to trade on the knowledge of the impending block trade, and the option 
category is most sensitive to underlying price changes. Panel A indicates that most trades are 
executed in OTM and ATM options. The majority of trading, in all options classes is 
executed after the block transactions. Results for downtick blocks, in Panel B are similar. 
Trading is concentrated in OTM and ATM options after the block trade. These results 
indicate that brokers do not use the options market (on average) to front-run impending block 
trades in the underlying security. 
 
Panel A shows that most trades are executed in OTM and ATM options. The majority of 
trading in all options is after the block transactions. Panel B shows that for downtick blocks 
trades when comparing calls and puts before the block trade, the options traded are those that 
are OTM or ATM, but again trading is predominantly after the block transaction. 
The results sin Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 do not provide any evidence that brokers are front-
running. Brokers take positions in both call and put options (both buys and sells), with the 
majority of trading occurring after the block trade. 
Table 6.5 Broker ID Analysis 
 This table presents statistics on the trades executed in the options market by the broker who initiated the block trade in the underlying 
market across all block trades analysed. Timing of Trade represents whether or not the trade is executed before or after the block trade. 
Total Number represents the total number of trades executed by the broker on the same date as the block trade. Total Volume represents 
the total volume of contracts traded by that broker on the same day as the block trade. Panel A is for uptick block trades and Panel B is for 
downtick block trades. 
 Call Buy Put sell Put Buy Call Sell 
Timing of Trade 
Total 
Number 
Total 
Volume 
Total 
Number 
Total 
Volume 
Total 
Number 
Total 
Volume 
Total 
Number 
Total 
Volume 
Panel A : Uptick Block Trades 
Before Block 1,109 29,207 587 10,842 886 12,093 1,000 22,120 
After Block 1,574 27,979 1,763 27,638 1,749 26,033 1,234 26,807 
Total 2,683 57,186 2,350 38,480 2,635 38,126 2,234 48,927 
Panel B : Downtick Block Trades 
Before Block 1,177 24,673 839 10,406 890 13,371 1,728 26,106 
After Block 2,018 54,400 1,563 29,079 2,002 38,891 1,914 53,063 
Total 3,195 79,073 2,402 39,485 2,892 52,262 3,642 79,169 
 
 
Table 6.6 Broker ID Analysis by Moneyness 
This presents statistics on the trades executed in the options market by the broker who initiated the block trade in the underlying market across 
all block trades analysed. Timing of Trade represents whether or not the trade is executed before or after the block trade. Moneyness Class s 
represents whether or not the option trade was ‘out-of-the-money (OTM), ‘at-the-money’ (ATM) or ‘in-the-money’ (ITM) at the time of trade 
Total Number represents the total number of trades executed by the broker on the same date as the block trade. Total Volume represents the 
total volume of contracts traded by that broker on the same day as the block trade. Panel A is for uptick block trades and Panel B is for 
downtick Block trades. 
 Call Buy Put sell Put Buy Call Sell 
Timing of 
Trade 
Moneyness 
Class 
Number of 
Trades 
Total 
Volume 
Number of 
Trades 
Total 
Volume 
Number of 
Trades 
Total 
Volume 
Number of 
Trades 
Total 
Volume 
Panel A : Uptick Block Trade 
Before 
Block OTMa 522 12,244 118 2,715 181 3,100 416 10,494 
Trade ITMa 374 9,630 240 4,109 321 4,082 427 8,376 
 ATMa 213 7,333 229 4,018 384 4,911 157 3,250 
Total  1,109 29,207 587 10,842 886 12,093 1,000 22,120 
 OTMa 732 14,015 255 4,169 357 5,704 528 11,173 
After Block ITMa 548 8,922 545 8,744 569 8,956 466 10,839 
Trade ATMa 294 5,042 963 14,725 823 11,373 240 4,795 
Total   1,574 27,979 1,763 27,638 1,749 26,033 1,234 26807 
Panel B: Downtick Block Trade 
Before 
Block  OTMa 433 10,842 141 1,547 165 2,204 629 10,920 
Trade ITMa 538 10,097 350 4,893 354 5,012 813 9,938 
 ATMa 206 3,734 348 3,966 371 6,155 286 5,248 
Total  1,177 24,673 839 10,406 890 13,371 1,728 26,106 
 OTMa 929 30,430 292 5,345 423 8,259 953 31,125 
After Block ITMa 767 15,402 602 9,941 704 10,304 681 14,907 
Trade ATMa 322 8,568 669 13,793 875 20,328 280 7,031 
Total   2,018 54,400 1,563 29,079 2,002 38,891 1,914 53,063 
a ATM options are defined as those having a moneyness ratio between 0.98 and 1.02 (see section) anything below is classed as OTM and 
anything above is classed as ITM. 
7. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
In addition to the above three procedures, the following three modifications are performed to 
ensure that results for the above tests are robust. 
 
7.1 Longer time frame 
 
Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) show that abnormal returns begin thirty minutes prior to the 
block transaction. Stephan and Whaley (1990) show that the stock market leads the options by 
up to 15 minutes, while Finucane (1999) shows that stocks lead options by a few second 
leading up to 6 minutes. This suggests that the analysis of relationship can be extended to 
include block trades that occur earlier or later on in the trading day. The original sample only 
includes the block trades executed between 11:30am and 2:00pm. To ensure that these 
excluded block trades do not affect the relationship significantly, the time frame is extended 
to cover the period 10:30am to 3:00pm.  
Table 7.1 provides descriptive statistics for the block trades selected from the original 
population based on the criteria: (1) there is only one block per day (2) it lies between 
10:00am and 3:00pm and, (3) it was the largest uptick or downtick trade by volume for that 
day. Apart from marginally higher mean values for both the volume traded and the value of 
the trades for uptick and downtick block trades, there is no significant difference compared to 
the original sample of block trades analysed.  
 
Table 7.1 Block Trade Descriptive Statistics II 
This table presents the mean, median and range of the number of shares traded and the dollar value 
(in millions) for the sample and population of block trades on 26 stocks which traded on the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and had listed options that also traded on the (ASX) for the 
period spanning 1 March, 2006 and 30 September, 2006. The block trades in the population of are 
defined as in Frino, Jarnecic, Johnson and Lepone (2005) as the largest 1% of on-market 
transactions for each stock. The sample of block trades are selected using the following criteria: (1) 
only one block trade per day (2) it lies between the time period 10:30am and 3:00pm and, (3) it is 
the largest trade by volume for both uptick and downtick blocks. 
 Uptick blocks Downtick blocks 
Statistic 
Sample   
N = 1585 
Population 
 N = 38876 
Sample  
 N = 1554 
Population  
N = 38360 
Panel A : Number of Shares Traded (Thousands) 
     Mean            77.93            52.20                87.86               52.20 
     Median            32.27            25.00                32.59               25.00 
     Minimum              5.00              5.00                  5.00                 5.00 
     Maximum        2,300.06              4.00            4,000.00           4,000.00 
Panel B : Dollar Value of shares traded (Thousands) 
     Mean           651.60           528.70               653.29              527.35 
     Median           490.00            42.24               474.45               42.00 
     Minimum           139.60              5.00               137.85              129.10 
     Maximum        8,602.22      14,480.00          14,480.00         14,480.00 
 
Table 7.2 presents the results for the behaviour of share, call option and put option prices in 
the intervals around the block trade in the underlying stock. Prices are examined in the four 
15 minute intervals preceding the block trade and the eight 15 minute intervals following, for 
both uptick and downtick block trades.  The interval containing the block trade is also 
examined. Panel A and Panel B show the mean abnormal return for the different securities 
and their relevant p-values for the students’ one-tail t-test statistic.  
 
 
 
Table 7.2 Stock, Call Options and Put Options Abnormal returns around Block 
Transactions 
This table presents results for the abnormal returns generated around block trades in the underlying 
stock market, call options and put options. Time interval represents the fifteen minute interval under 
analysis. Mean Abnormal return represents the arithmetic average of abnormal returns in the interval 
(measured in percentage). 
 Shares Call Options Put Options 
Time 
Interval 
(minutes) 
Mean 
Abnormal 
return (%) 
p-value 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
Abnormal 
return (%) 
p-value 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
Abnormal 
return (%) 
p-value 
(t-statistic) 
Panel A : Uptick Blocks 
-60 0.0117 0.3108 0.7185 0.6536 -0.2178 0.8431 
-45 0.0160 0.1533 6.3907 0.1746 -1.6730 0.0925 
-30 0.0175 0.0767 1.8833 0.2398 -0.3698 0.6487 
-15 0.0562 0.0000 1.1175 0.3791 -2.2869 0.0811 
0 0.0985 0.0000 2.0918 0.0720 -1.9715 0.0378 
15 0.0148 0.0568 2.2716 0.0736 1.6090 0.0947 
30 -0.0020 0.7891 1.2484 0.1280 0.8211 0.5784 
45 0.0093 0.2068 0.0977 0.9198 0.1214 0.9075 
60 0.0106 0.1401 2.7910 0.0118 0.2453 0.7366 
75 -0.0032 0.6222 1.0522 0.4941 0.8429 0.6834 
90 -0.0010 0.8833 -0.8859 0.3223 1.0816 0.3680 
105 -0.0031 0.6415 -1.5547 0.3499 0.0667 0.9269 
120 0.0057 0.3769 1.3007 0.2965 -0.8317 0.4186 
Panel B : Downtick Blocks 
-60 -0.0192 0.1086 -0.9198 0.4901 -0.5686 0.5973 
-45 0.0151 0.1820 -1.3775 0.1748 -0.0476 0.9647 
-30 -0.0127 0.1774 2.2558 0.0234 -0.6538 0.5532 
-15 -0.0663 0.0000 2.3169 0.0727 -0.0205 0.9726 
0 -0.0882 0.0000 -1.8627 0.0685 -0.0093 0.9913 
15 -0.0021 0.7989 0.8699 0.6163 0.7961 0.2842 
30 0.0000 0.9964 0.0893 0.9391 1.7139 0.3562 
45 -0.0070 0.3426 1.3641 0.7276 0.4933 0.4646 
60 0.0066 0.3616 -0.4824 0.8624 1.0134 0.2108 
75 -0.0003 0.9707 -0.4612 0.7054 1.3807 0.2592 
90 0.0081 0.2617 0.7669 0.5986 -1.7507 0.0407 
105 0.0017 0.8059 1.4924 0.2665 0.6271 0.4273 
120 0.0075 0.2744 -0.7127 0.5638 1.9446 0.0279 
 
 
The results from Panel A indicate, as expected, that there is significant positive abnormal 
returns starting in the fifteen minute period prior to the block trade and concluding in the 
interval of the block trade for shares. Call options only show significant abnormal return 
behaviour in the interval sixty minutes after the block trade. There is positive price movement 
in the intervals fifteen minutes before the block trade and at the block trade; this is significant 
at the 10% level. Put options exhibit significant negative abnormal price behaviour in the 
block trade interval. These results are consistent with the results from the original tests, and 
are consistent with the notion that stocks lead options.  
Panel B indicates that for downtick block trades, stocks display significant negative abnormal 
returns starting in the interval fifteen minutes before the block trade and ending at the block 
trade. For call options, there is an abnormal return in the interval fifteen minutes after the 
block trade of 2.26% (p-value = 0.023); all returns following this are insignificant. For Put 
options, the only significant return occurs in the interval ninety minutes after the block trade, 
consistent with stocks leading options. 
The above results are consistent with the previous fifteen minute results that stock returns lead 
option returns. Table 7.3 presents the results for the regression analysis of stock option 
abnormal returns on the lead, lag and contemporaneous share abnormal returns for stocks in 
the four intervals before and the eight intervals following the new sample of block trades. The 
table shows the results for both call options and put options. Panel A presents results for 
uptick block trades and Panel B presents results for downtick block trades. 
 
Table 7.3 Regressions of Option Abnormal returns on the Lag, Lead and 
Contemporaneous Stock Abnormal returns 
This Table presents the results for regressing abnormal returns in the options market 
with the lead, lag and contemporaneous stock abnormal returnsa in the fifteen minute 
intervals starting one hour before and ending one hour after the block trade. The 
equation estimated is: 
 
Where ARkjt is the abnormal return on security j in time interval t, and k is O for 
options and S for stocks.  
 Call options Puts options 
Coefficient Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
 Panel A : Uptick blocks 
α 0.0029 0.63 -0.0027 -0.84 
β-1 -3.4149 -2.44* 0.6819 0.55 
β0 9.2035 7.54** -9.0948 -8.71** 
β1 8.7860 7.18** -9.6722 -8.49** 
  
Panel A: Downtick Blocks 
α 0.0061 0.71 -0.0010 -0.34 
β-1 0.5336 0.61 -0.5402 -0.53 
β0 6.5673 2.19* -5.5663 -6.26** 
β1 8.6913 2.95* -6.2256 -5.63** 
a Abnormal return in time interval t is the difference between the observed return in 
time interval t and the average return on the security in time interval t across the 
previous 60 trading days. 
* Denotes significance at the 0.05 level 
** Denote significance at the 0.01 level 
 
As expected, Panel A shows that the co-efficients for both the lag share (β1) and 
contemporaneous share (β0) are significant and positive (negative) for call options (put 
options), consistent with the results from the regression performed on the returns around the 
original sample of block trades. Results are similar for downtick block trades in Panel B. The 
only result that is different from the original regression is that the co-efficient on the lead 
share (β-1) for uptick block trades and call options is significant, However in order for this 
result to suggest that there is feedback relationship, the co-efficient needs to be positive. The 
co-efficient is negative, providing further evidence that there is no feedback relationship 
between the options and shares. 
7.2 Additional block trades 
 
As in Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992), this dissertation examines the effect of block trades on 
options prices; however it is constrained to only one block trade per day to ensure there are no 
confounding effects between other large trades. To ensure that the results are robust across a 
number of block trades per day, each trading day is split into two intervals, spanning 11:00am 
to 12:00pm and 2:00pm to 3:00pm. The choice of these time periods is to make certain that 
any effects of earlier (later) trades do not affect the returns of the previous block trade.  
Table 7.4 provides descriptive statistics for the block trades selected from the original 
population based on the criteria (1) the trade lies between 11:00am and 12:00pm or 2:00pm 
and 3:00pm (2) and it is the largest uptick or downtick trade by volume for that time period. 
As expected, there is little difference between this, the sample from the previous test and the 
original sample of block trades selected. 
 
Table 7.5 presents the results for the behaviour of shares, call options and put options prices 
in the intervals around the block trade in the underlying stock. Prices are examined in the two 
15 minute intervals preceding the block trade and the four 15 minute intervals following for 
both uptick and downtick block trades.  The interval containing the block trade is also 
examined. Panel A and Panel B present the mean abnormal return for the different securities 
and their relevant p-values for the students’ one-tail t test statistic.  
 
Table 7.4 Block Trade Descriptive Statistics III 
This table presents the mean, median and range of the number of shares traded and the dollar value 
(in millions) for the sample and population of block trades on 26 stocks which traded on the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and had listed options that also traded on the (ASX) for the 
period spanning 1 March, 2006 and 30 September, 2006. The block trades in the population are 
defined as in Frino, Jarnecic, Johnson and Lepone (2005) as the largest 1% of on-market 
transactions for each stock. The sample of block trades is selected using the following criteria: (1) 
it lies between the time period 11:00am est. and 12:00pm aest. Or 2:00pm est. and 3:00pm aest. 
And (2) It is the largest trade by volume for both uptick and downtick blocks within each periods. 
 Uptick blocks Downtick blocks 
Statistic 
Sample  
 N = 1664 
Population 
N = 38876 
Sample  
 N = 1645 
Population 
N = 38360 
Panel A : Number of Shares Traded (Millions) 
     Mean            82.53             52.20                 87.81               52.20  
     Median            35.00             25.00                 34.16               25.00  
     Minimum              5.01               5.00                   5.01                 5.00  
     Maximum      11,000.00         4,000.00             4,000.00           4,000.00  
Panel B : Dollar Value of shares traded (Millions) 
     Mean           683.77            528.70                672.39              527.35  
     Median           523.67            422.43                493.32              420.00  
     Minimum           140.00               5.00                140.00              129.10  
     Maximum        4,725.00       14,480.00           14,480.00         14,480.00  
 
The results from Panel A indicate that there is a significant positive abnormal return starting 
in the thirty minute period prior to the block trade and concluding in the interval of the block 
trade for shares around uptick block trades. Call options do not exhibit any significant 
abnormal returns around block trades. Put option results are similar to those of the call 
options6. While these results do not suggest that one market leads the other, they do not 
contradict the earlier results.  
Panel B indicates that returns around downtick block trades for stocks display significant 
negative abnormal returns starting in the interval fifteen minutes before the block trade and 
ending at the block trade. For call options, the only significant return occurs in at the interval 
of the block trade and is negative. Results for put option return behaviour around downtick 
block trades indicate no significant abnormal returns. 
                                                            
6 There is a significant return (at the 10% level) in the interval fifteen minutes prior to the block trade. 
Table 7.5 Stock, Call Options and Put Options Abnormal returns around Block 
Transactions 
This table presents results for the abnormal returns generated around block trades in the underlying 
stock market, call options and put options. Time interval represents the fifteen minute interval under 
analysis. Mean Abnormal return represents the arithmetic average of abnormal returns in the interval 
(measured in percentage). 
 Shares Call Options Put Options 
Time 
Interval 
(minutes) 
Mean 
Abnormal 
return (%) 
p-value 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
Abnormal 
return (%) 
p-value 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
Abnormal 
return (%) 
p-value 
(t-statistic) 
Uptick Blocks 
-30 0.0263 0.0007 3.9494 0.3173 -0.6111 0.6923 
-15 0.0333 0.0001 1.7794 0.6719 -3.9872 0.0659 
0 0.0826 0.0000 0.7444 0.7655 -3.0693 0.1291 
15 0.0158 0.0321 -0.0538 0.9790 3.3384 0.3129 
30 0.0124 0.0781 1.6356 0.5639 -0.3810 0.8197 
45 0.0055 0.4575 2.6838 0.2168 -1.9355 0.4820 
60 0.0092 0.1889 0.0040 0.9987 0.5169 0.8065 
Downtick Blocks 
-30 -0.0028 0.7282 5.1542 0.1273 -3.3275 0.2175 
-15 -0.0391 0.0000 4.6777 0.0804 0.0533 0.9681 
0 -0.0757 0.0000 -5.3637 0.0092 2.1724 0.3516 
15 -0.0018 0.7977 0.5051 0.8117 1.9364 0.2623 
30 -0.0073 0.3219 0.3628 0.6988 -0.4933 0.7800 
45 -0.0103 0.1323 1.1156 0.4902 0.6661 0.7411 
60 0.0069 0.3132 -1.4974 0.3591 1.2383 0.5351 
 
The above results do not provide any conclusive evidence that stock returns lead option 
returns or vice versa. Table 7.6 presents the results for the regression analysis of stock option 
abnormal returns on the lead, lag and contemporaneous share abnormal returns for stocks in 
the two intervals before and the four intervals following the new sample of block trades.  
The results in Panel A (Panel B) show that for call options (put options), the co-efficient on 
the contemporaneous share (β0) is significant and positive (negative) for call options (put 
options) which is consistent with the results from the regression results presented in Table 6.4 
and Table 7.5. The results differ from the previous results in that there in that there is no 
significance on any of the co-efficients relating to the lag share (β1). This is most likely due to 
the decreased number of intervals prior to the block trade analysed compared to the previous 
regressions. These results suggest that there is no feedback relationship between stocks and 
options when looking at a shorter time frame. 
Table 7.6 Regressions of Option Abnormal returns on the Lag, Lead and 
Contemporaneous Stock Abnormal returns 
 This Table presents the results for regressing abnormal returns in the options market 
with the lead, lag and contemporaneous stock abnormal returnsa in the fifteen minute 
intervals starting one hour before and ending one hour after the block trade. The 
equation estimated is: 
 
 
Where ARkjt is the abnormal return on security j in time interval t, and k is O for 
options and S for stocks. 
Call options Puts options 
Coefficient Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
 Panel A : Uptick blocks 
α 0.0040 0.35 -0.0104 -1.04 
β-1 2.9138 0.60 -0.5026 -0.11 
β0 11.0093 2.05* -5.3258 -1.10 
β1 2.2153 0.61 -4.7248 -1.12 
  
Panel A: Downtick Blocks 
α 0.0075 0.82 0.0022 0.35 
β-1 4.1576 1.26 2.3361 0.70 
β0 11.8400 4.12** -10.4756 -5.78** 
β1 7.63514 1.96 -2.7816 -1.03 
a Abnormal return in time interval t is the difference between the observed return in 
time interval t and the average return on the security in time interval t across the 
previous 60 trading days. 
* Denotes significance at the 0.05 level 
** Denote significance at the 0.01 level 
 
 
 
7.3 Five minute intervals 
 
When calculating returns, Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992) use a 15 minute time frame as any 
longer would bias the results not to find a relationship, and any shorter would yield too many 
missing observations.  To ensure that 15 minutes is an appropriate time frame, the same 
methodology is applied but for a shorter 5 minute interval, similar to Chan, Chung and 
Johnson (1993) and Stephan and Whaley (1990). Finucane (1999) notes that using greater 
than five minute intervals will tend to obscure leads, and may incorrectly lead to the 
conclusion that there is no lead in either market. Particularly for the ASX options market with 
lower liquidity in comparison to the underlying equity market, a shorter interval will allow for 
trades contained within the 15 minute interval to be captured and their return analysed. 
 
Using five minute intervals generates 37 five minute return intervals. As the earlier return 
results suggest that there is price movement starting in the thirty minutes before and 
continuing in the sixty minutes following the block trade, Table 7.7 presents the results for the 
returns analysed in the five minute intervals thirty minutes before the block trade and sixty 
minutes after the block trade. Panel A presents the results for uptick block trades and Panel B 
presents the results for downtick block trades. Panel A and Panel B show the mean abnormal 
return for the different securities and their relevant p-values for the students’ one-tail t-test 
statistic. 
Panel A indicates that for uptick block trades, shares exhibit the same behaviour, with a 
significant price run-up beginning in the interval 10 minutes prior to the block trade and 
ending at that interval of the block trade. This is consistent with the results for the fifteen 
minute interval returns. Unlike the results from the fifteen minute intervals, call option returns 
show a significant negative return in the twenty minutes prior to the block trade, but the 
subsequent intervals show positive returns up to twenty-five minutes after the block trade. 
Results for put option returns indicate a significant negative abnormal return in the interval 
ten minutes after the block trade. This is also consistent with the results from the original 
tests. 
 
Table 7.7 Stock, Call Options and Put Options Abnormal returns around Block 
Transactions 
This table presents results for the abnormal returns generated around block trades in the underlying 
stock market, call options and put options. Time interval represents the fifteen minute interval under 
analysis. Mean Abnormal return represents the arithmetic average of abnormal returns in the interval 
(measured in percentage). 
 Shares Call Options Put Options 
Time 
Interval 
(minutes) 
Mean 
Abnormal 
return (%) 
p-value 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
Abnormal 
return (%) 
Time 
Interval 
(minutes) 
Mean 
Abnormal 
return (%) 
p-value 
(t-statistic) 
Panel A: Uptick Block Trades 
-30 0.00666 0.18134 -2.71333 0.12927 3.23668 n/a
-25 0.00568 0.23597 n/a n/a 0.52861 0.87717
-20 0.00550 0.23302 -8.63861 0.02703 -1.61943 0.68875
-15 0.00521 0.27417 2.45332 0.30454 -0.38971 0.72441
-10 0.01832 0.00013 1.78974 0.36509 -1.81688 0.24722
-5 0.02666 0.00000 -0.50827 0.89213 3.32844 0.13232
0 0.04155 0.00000 1.58520 0.29356 0.67932 0.48257
5 -0.00349 0.46007 1.73839 0.42456 0.86211 0.36708
10 0.00547 0.19408 1.82331 0.34011 -1.98078 0.02609
15 -0.00842 0.04424 0.55678 0.52848 -0.43953 0.62627
20 0.00290 0.47479 3.81981 0.16383 0.67460 0.53800
25 -0.00106 0.80394 5.97143 0.17114 0.27307 0.79693
30 0.00629 0.11378 -1.69995 0.38060 0.01256 0.98800
35 0.00377 0.38259 0.58933 0.85809 -0.00764 0.99644
40 0.00206 0.61178 2.05032 0.20816 1.08583 0.27496
45 -0.00296 0.47794 -0.31689 0.84305 -0.57508 0.45863
50 0.00484 0.21337 4.28784 0.10791 0.18124 0.77384
55 0.00412 0.28226 -1.02200 0.65820 -1.99206 0.00255
60 -0.00402 0.30228 2.60062 0.20001 0.16628 0.87671
 
 Table 7.7 Continued 
Panel B : Downtick Block Trades 
-30 -0.00528 0.24682 n/a n/a 0.22405 0.86342
-25 -0.00541 0.25114 5.93063 0.59760 -0.41096 0.91917
-20 -0.00592 0.16522 3.63374 0.26923 0.25203 0.91739
-15 -0.01003 0.02184 -4.82114 0.34073 -3.77284 0.22015
-10 -0.01209 0.01272 0.29817 0.31020 0.82557 0.47054
-5 -0.03808 0.00000 0.72888 0.48282 -1.20626 0.40750
0 -0.04065 0.00000 -2.03374 0.12229 -1.98684 0.06591
5 0.00984 0.02841 1.82059 0.41394 0.20371 0.89613
10 0.00319 0.46894 0.66240 0.71917 0.98799 0.22539
15 0.00611 0.14847 0.60013 0.64400 0.10813 0.90266
20 -0.00394 0.36225 -1.36643 0.30572 -1.15961 0.53466
25 -0.00629 0.14881 -1.89775 0.23189 -0.91394 0.43737
30 0.00312 0.44957 -0.11370 0.97085 0.86447 0.23416
35 0.00318 0.41853 3.08546 0.18325 1.65585 0.17165
40 0.00584 0.15642 3.40322 0.10112 -0.58359 0.47083
45 -0.00548 0.21038 0.82408 0.61082 0.67070 0.59093
50 -0.00115 0.77451 1.47565 0.36623 -1.65815 0.14644
55 0.00207 0.61234 -0.73185 0.63476 0.65705 0.45535
60 -0.00245 0.53600 0.28245 0.87059 0.59155 0.80377
 
Panel B indicates that for downtick block trades, stocks exhibit significant negative abnormal 
returns beginning fifteen minutes before the block trade and ending at the interval of the block 
trade. This is consistent with the results from the fifteen minute interval returns. Both call and 
put option returns indicate no significant abnormal returns in any of the intervals.  
Table 7.8 presents the results for the regression analysis of stock option abnormal returns on 
the lead, lag and contemporaneous share abnormal returns for stocks in the twelve intervals 
before and the twenty-four intervals following the block trade. The table shows the results for 
both call options and put options. Panel A presents results for uptick block trades and Panel B 
presents results for downtick block trades. 
 
Table 7.8 Regressions of Option Abnormal returns on the Lag, Lead and 
Contemporaneous Stock Abnormal returns 
This Table presents the results for regressing abnormal returns in the options market 
with the lead, lag and contemporaneous stock abnormal returnsa in the fifteen minute 
intervals starting one hour before and ending one hour after the block trade. The 
equation estimated is: 
 
Where ARkjt is the abnormal return on security j in time interval t, and k is O for 
options and S for stocks.  
 Call options Puts options 
Coefficient Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
 Panel A : Uptick blocks 
α 0.0140 2.79* -0.0002 -0.10 
β-1 -1.2709 -0.35 -2.5247 -2.20* 
β0 -3.4864 -0.94 2.0100 1.07 
β1 4.9660 1.43 -3.9407 -1.31 
     
Panel B: Downtick Blocks 
α -0.0007 -0.18 0.0059 1.68 
β-1 0.8437 0.25 3.9059 1.29 
β0 -0.36422 -0.12 2.5632 0.92 
β1 -0.23521 -0.08 0.0022 0.00 
a Abnormal return in time interval t is the difference between the observed return in 
time interval t and the average return on the security in time interval t across the 
previous 60 trading days. 
* Denotes significance at the 0.05 level 
** Denote significance at the 0.01 level 
 
In contrast to the results from Table 6.4, none of the co-efficients suggest any evidence of 
stocks leading the options. Panel A indicates that the only significant co-efficient is that on 
the lead share (β-1) for uptick block trades and put options. This result suggests that for uptick 
put options, there is in fact a lead relationship from the options to stock. This is similar to that 
of Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992), and is suggestive of inter-market front-running. However, 
the lack of significance on all other co-efficients casts doubt on whether or this suggests that 
options lead stocks.  
8. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examines the impact of a block trade in the underlying stock market on the 
returns of the options market. Previous studies on the lead-lag relationship between stock and 
options markets find conflicting results, with Manaster and Rendleman (1982) and Kumar, 
Sarin and Shastri (1992) finding that options lead stocks, while Stephan and Whaley (1990), 
Chan, Chung and Johnson (1993) and Finucane (1999) finding that stocks lead options.  
Jarnecic (1999) finds that stocks lead options on the ASX. This dissertation also considers this 
relationship, but through a more detailed data set, is able to examine individual trades 
performed by brokers in an attempt to find evidence of the existence of inter-market front-
running, as proposed by Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1992). 
 
Analysis of returns in the fifteen minute intervals before and after the block trade indicate that 
for shares, there are significant positive (negative) abnormal returns in the intervals fifteen 
minutes before the block trade and in the interval of the block trade. Cumulative Abnormal 
returns (CAR) indicate that for uptick block trades, there is a permanent positive price 
increase that continues after the block trade, and that for downtick block trades there is a 
negative price reaction, followed by a partial price reversal. These results are consistent with 
previous studies on block trades on the ASX by Aitken and Frino (1996) and Anderson, 
Cooper and Provost (2006). 
 
For call options, results indicate abnormal returns in the intervals fifteen minutes post, and at 
the block trade, for uptick and downtick block trades respectively. CAR results show a 
significant upward trend as documented for shares around uptick blocks, but begin up to thirty 
minutes after the trade is executed. There are no significant CARs for downtick block trades. 
For put options, results indicate that abnormal returns occur in the fifteen minutes preceding 
the block trade for uptick block trades and in the fifteen minutes following the block trade for 
downtick block trades. CAR results for downtick block trades indicate that the price of put 
options is increasing in the intervals greater than thirty minutes after the block trade. These 
results are consistent with the results from Stephan and Whaley (1990) and Chan, Chung and 
Johnson (1993) that stocks lead options. 
Causality tests performed on the abnormal returns before and after the block trade between 
options and stocks indicate that option returns are related to the lagged and contemporaneous 
returns in the share market. This is consistent with stocks leading options. Unlike Kumar, 
Sarin and Shastri (1992), there is no evidence that the lead share return is significant. 
Additional Robustness tests confirm the original test results indicating that stocks lead the 
options market.  
In depth broker ID analysis reveals that brokers executing block trades in the underlying 
market, traded more options  after the block trade is executed for both uptick and downtick 
block trades. Chakravarty, Gulen and Mayhew (2004) and Pan and Poteshman (2006) note 
that informed traders are more likely to trade options that are ‘Out of the Money’ (OTM). 
Broker analysis split into moneyness categories indicate that as hypothesised, the majority of 
trading occurrs in the OTM and ‘At the money’ (ATM) options. These results do not provide 
conclusive evidence of inter-market front-running, as even though these trades are in OTM 
and ATM money options, there is significantly more trading after the block than before the 
block trade. 
The overall results of this dissertation are consistent with the work performed in the US 
markets by Stephan and Whaley (1990), Chan, Chung and Johnson (1993) and Finucane 
(1999), and the work performed on the ASX by Jarnecic (1999), and suggest that the stock 
market leads the options market. There is also no evidence of any inter-market front-running. 
 
This dissertation provides a number of future avenues for research. Block transactions are 
defined in this study as the largest 1% of on-market transactions for that particular stock, 
Chan and Lakonishok (1995) point out that for institutions “even a moderately sized position 
may represent a large fractions of the stocks trading volume”, causing them to break up their 
large trade into a sequence of smaller trades over a number of trading days. Analysis can be 
extended to using a “trade package” as defined in Chan and Lakonishok (1995) rather than a 
single trade. This would then require analysis over a number of trading days relating to the 
package. Furthermore informed trades may the split up their option trading over a number of 
days, requiring analysis of broker ID’s over the days of the ‘trade package’. This study could 
also be performed using trading volume as a proxy for information arrival, as used in Anthony 
(1988). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX A 
 
Exchange traded options 
 
Name Exchange traded options 
 
Underlying Security Any share approved by ASX under Guidelines for Listing Equity 
Options 
 
Security Code The first three characters are the ASX code eg. BHP, the fourth and 
fifth character are the clearing code which is randomly assigned by 
the ASX. 
 
Contract Size Usually 1,000 shares per contract. This may be adjusted for rights, 
bonus issues and other capital adjustment events. 
 
Tick Size $0.001 per share = $1.00 (contract size 1000 shares) 
 
Exercise Style Usually American, i.e. exercisable on or before the expiry date. 
 
Exercise Price Generally set by the ACH subject to strike price intervals. 
Occasionally subject to an adjustment due to a corporate action by 
the underlying company. 
 
Type Call and put options 
 
Contract Months As detailed in ASX Derivatives Division expiry calendar 
 
Expiry Date Thursday before last Friday of the settlement month. This may 
change due to public holidays 
 
Trading Hours Normal trading 10.00am to 4.20pm (Sydney time). Late trading 
4.20pm to 5.00pm and overseas trading in accordance with the ASX 
Market Rules 
 
Settlement Physical delivery of underlying security 
 
Under $2 = 10c strike intervals 
 
$2 - $10 = 25c strike intervals 
 
Strike Price 
Intervals 
$10 above = 50c strike intervals 
 
Source: Australian Securities Exchange website 
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